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Abstract
Deregulation, technological change, and the integration of markets increase the
competitive pressures on forms of national and sectoral governance. The heart of
the issue is whether the Continental, consensus-oriented model of capitalism is
gravitating toward the Anglo-Saxon, market-oriented model. This essay exam-
ines the heuristic value of this convergence thesis, using the German financial
sector and its relations to industry and government as a case in point. It will be
argued that while institutional restructuring is taking place within Germany that
reflects characteristics of Anglo-Saxon capitalism, institutional hurdles, such as
federal structures and the veto power of certain societal lobbies, have thus far
prevented such a convergence throughout the entire system.
Zusammenfassung
Deregulierungsprozesse, technologischer Wandel und die Integration von
Märkten setzen nationale und sektorale Institutionen der Marktkoordination
unter Wettbewerbsdruck. Im Kern geht es hierbei um die Frage, ob sich der kon-
tinentale, auf Konsens und Koordination ausgerichtete Kapitalismustyp dem an-
gelsächsischen, eher marktorientierten Typ annähert. Der Beitrag untersucht die
Reichweite dieser Konvergenzthese am Beispiel des deutschen Finanzsektors,
seiner Beziehungen zur Industrie und zum Staat. Es wird argumentiert, daß im
deutschen Modell ein institutioneller Umbau stattfindet, der Charakterzüge des
angelsächsischen Kapitalismus in sich trägt. Gleichwohl verhindern institutio-
nelle Bremsen wie föderale Strukturen und Vetopositionen gesellschaftlicher
Lobbygruppen bislang eine systemweite Konvergenz.
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Variations of Capitalism between Divergence and Convergence
In the past decade, the managed capitalism thriving in the Federal Republic of
Germany has been under an unprecedented pressure to change. The integration
of global and European markets, the unleashing of capitalism after the collapse of
socialism in the East, German unification, and the emergence of the neoliberal
economic doctrine have all played important roles. The unrestricted mobility of
financial capital in particular increases the competition among national regimes
of capitalism.
What this actually boils down to is the competition between two ideal types of
capitalist regimes, which still peacefully coexisted in the early 1980s: the ‘Rhen-
ish’ managed capitalism, found foremost in Germany, and the ‘Atlantic’ market-
oriented capitalism, flourishing primarily in the United States and Great Britain
(Albert 1993).1
As Shonfield suggests in his analysis of the postwar period, the German model of
‘organized’ or managed capitalism is characterized by a high degree of collective
functioning in the industrial and financial sectors (Shonfield 1965: 239–298).2 A
number of cartel-like arrangements and umbrella associations which often enjoy
a semi-public status (so-called ‘private interest governments’; Streeck/ Schmitter
1985) help co-ordinate the processes of introducing change to the various eco-
nomic sectors, both from the side of management and of labour. In the world of
corporate finance, banks play the major role, not the capital market. Since Ger-
man universal banks lend money, own stock and vote at shareholders’ meetings,
and have seats on the supervisory boards of their corporate clients, they are able
to continually influence the management policy of these firms. Since, in turn, a
great deal of information on corporate management policy is transmitted to the
banks, they are more willing to support longer-term investment strategies by
                                                
I am indebted to Richard Deeg, Josef Esser, Greg Jackson and Willie Paterson for helpful
comments on earlier versions of this paper and to Dona Geyer for her translation of the
paper from the German.
1 Rhodes/van Apeldoorn (1998) distinguish between ‘market-oriented versus net-
work-oriented’ types of capitalism. For a further differentiation, see Schmidt (2000),
who identifies ‘state capitalism’ as a third type and Fukuyama (1995), who charac-
terizes the capitalist regime of Southeast Asia as ‘family capitalism’.
2 Drawing on model characteristics introduced in the debate in economic sociology on
the variations of national ‘production regimes’ (see Zysman 1983; Streeck 1997; Sos-
kice 1999), this paper will focus on the aspects of the transformation of national mod-
els relevant to political science, such as changes in the realm of business, politics and
the role and possible impact of governments.
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granting comprehensive and low-interest credit (patient capital) and to bail their
clients out of financial crisis. In this way, a company is integrated into a strong
network of partners that largely protects each member firm from attempts at a
‘hostile takeover’ by other companies. Co-operative labour relations within the
company are maintained by insuring employee rights of codetermination on the
supervisory board. In stakeholder capitalism, company policy remains opaque to
those on the outside, especially to small shareholders. Contributing to such
opaqueness are the laws governing stock corporations, capital markets, and ac-
counting standards, which allow market actors a great deal of discretion in de-
termining the confidentiality of business information. These laws also enable
management to calculate profits and losses over longer periods of time and to
survive phases of severe losses better with the aid of tax-favoured reserves (ac-
counting principle of caution). Such a strategy guarantees shareholders the payment
of unchanged dividends over a period of time, even though the dividend may
remain below the market value of the corporation’s earnings and profits. The ad-
vantage of such a model is that it nurtures close and long-lasting relations, which
serve as a type of infrastructure for the company and enable it to pursue man-
aged strategies of crisis management. Since much responsibility rests on the
shoulders of corporative entities such as cartels, associations and corporate man-
agement, the burden of responsibility on the state is significantly lightened.
However, the state is incorporated into the system by being a partner on the na-
tional level and a member of numerous co-ordinating bodies.
The Anglo-Saxon model of market-oriented capitalism is characterized by more
loosely coupled relations between industry, finance, and government. Within the
industrial and financial sectors, associations act more like lobbies than like self-
regulating institutions, and a strict antitrust policy prevents the creation, at least
in the United States, of cartel-like structures of self-help in business. In the corpo-
rate finance system, banks do not play a major role. Instead they act more as buy-
ers and sellers of securities, diversify their corporate stock holdings and tend to
sell these during crises. Companies use the organized capital market first and
foremost as a source to raise capital; they also diversify their ownership by being
publicly traded. Rather than a strong network of stockholders and financial in-
stitutions, it is the market, meaning the stock market quotation of companies,
which has the greatest influence on corporate management. Poor management is
punished with falling stock prices and a drop in dividend payments, and the
danger of an aggressive takeover increases very rapidly. Successful management
rewards its shareholders with more frequent dividend payments during short-
term periods of accrued profit. The advantage of a system based on short-term
contacts is the ability to adapt immediately to changes on the market. Such a
shareholder value orientation also tends to characterize labour relations. Incentives
such as share-option programs and special performance-dependent bonuses help
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motivate top managers to pursue company interests aggressively. This investor-
oriented system is supported, at least in the United States, by a rigid and formal-
ized regulation of capital markets (in the area of corporate accounting standards
and stock market regulation), which requires the public disclosure and reporting
of information on the company and its market performance (true and fair view
principle). This is enforced in part by law. Like the model of managed capitalism,
this model of market-oriented capitalism does not place government at the centre
of events. The state does, however, act as a liberal regulator that interprets its
major function as being the guarantor of market transparency.
The peaceful coexistence of these different models of capitalism seems to be in-
creasingly endangered. The deregulation of previously nationalized or at least
nationally supervised economic sectors has increased the competition between
national enterprises and thus the pressure to create more innovative products
rapidly while reducing labour and capital costs. Decision-making processes that
have traditionally relied internally on a consensus between management and la-
bour and externally on co-ordination with associations, banks, and governmental
representatives become costly when the quick responses are the international or-
der of the day. The globalization of financial markets clears the way for the rapid
and worldwide supply of capital and for a commercialization of the relations
between creditors and debtors. Lastly, growing markets and increasing anonym-
ity require the disclosure and formalization of the rules of conduct in the market-
place.
It is sometimes argued that the more product and capital markets are integrated,
the more the model of managed capitalism will be deliberately coerced to adapt
to its Anglo-Saxon counterpart. In this paper, the accuracy of this convergence
thesis will be explored in the case of the German financial sector and its relations
to business and the state. Until now, finance was always part of a national con-
figuration of capitalism and thereby helped significantly to shape the mecha-
nisms of a capitalist economy specific to a nation. However, in the German model
an important transformation is taking place that reveals characteristics of the An-
glo-Saxon model in the distribution of property rights, the nature of politics, the
definition of polities and the creation of policy. At the same time, convergence of
the models throughout the entire system has been prevented until now by insti-
tutional ‘brakes’ such as federal structures and by the consideration given those
clientele, closely affiliated with party politics, who may be the losers in the mod-
ernization process.
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The Old Model: Cartels, Corporatism and Self-Regulation3
Until now, the German banking sector has been dominated by the competition
between three main types of institutions (group competition) which vary in their
business strategy and corporate structure: the private commercial banks, the
public or non-commercial savings banks (including the banks of each Land), and
the credit co-operatives. The members of all three groups are universal banks,
which are permitted to trade in securities and to deal in deposit-banking and
lending. Unlike private commercial banks, the federally established savings
banks and credit co-operatives are also charged with the task of pursuing goals
that are good for the general welfare, in addition to those that are strictly good for
their business. For the savings banks and Länder banks, one such goal is to ensure
that all regions are sufficiently provided with financial services (principle of territo-
riality) and another is to use Länder banks to fulfil aims of industrial policy. As in-
stitutions of public law, the savings banks are supported in this business by their
communities and the Länder banks by their respective state and municipal gov-
ernments. They shoulder an unlimited liability for their banks by guaranteeing
funds to cover unrecoverable capital (losses) and thereby insure the further exis-
tence of the banks (Anstaltslast). For credit co-operatives, the collective purpose of
the institutions lies in the support of their members, who traditionally have been
private customers and small skilled labour and retail businesses. Similar to the
savings bank sector, the existence of each institution is guaranteed, since the
members of the co-operative are personally liable for the organization in propor-
tion to the number of shares each holds (Nachschußpflicht).
This limited degree of competition is also supported strongly by umbrella associa-
tions, acting as ‘private interest governments’ which can make binding commitments
on behalf of the entire banking business. A glance at the history of the develop-
ment of the German Savings Banks and Giro Association (Deutscher Sparkassen-
und Giroverband, DSGV) and the Federal Association of Credit Co-operatives
(Bundesverband der Volks- und Raiffeisenbanken, BVR) shows that these associations
have nearly always assumed the task of auditing the books of their members as
was stipulated in the Prussian auditing ordinance, or more specifically in the Co-
operative Association Law. The umbrella organization for the private commercial
banking business, the Federal Association of German Banks (Bundesverband
deutscher Banken, BdB), also assumes certain ‘public duties’ because it runs a soli-
darity fund, financed by all member banks to protect customer deposits against
bankruptcy and insolvency (deposit insurance). In practice, private banks are
compelled to join the private banking association, because they are only permit-
                                                
3 To get a general idea of the German model, see Story/Walter (1997: 162–170).
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ted to operate when they can prove their membership in a deposit insurance
fund.4
Within the banking sector, we thus find an impressive degree of internal govern-
ance, the foremost purpose of which is to guarantee the continued existence of
member firms and thereby stabilize the entire sector. Similar structures and func-
tions can also be found in the relationship between banks and industry. The Haus-
bank relationship, so essential to the German model, is usually considered to have
its roots in the financial participation of German banks during the industrializa-
tion that took place in the latter third of the nineteenth century. Alexander Ger-
schenkron (1962) has explained this quasi-symbiotic relationship between ‘trust
banks’ and the business leaders of trade and industry, by pointing out the relative
backwardness of a country that is considered to have been a latecomer to indus-
trial development. Close relationships between banks and industry seemed to be
a functional solution to the need to mobilize large sums of capital for investment.
However, historians have challenged this functionalist perception by arguing that
the power balance between banks and firms differed according to firm size, sector
and region (Kocka 1978)5: Banks preferred large firms to small ones. They figured
prominently in coal, steel, heavy machinery and the electrical industry, but never
played a major role in textiles, machine tools or the chemical industry, whose rate
of self-financing has traditionally been quite high. Up to 1900, the chemical in-
dustry was able to finance between one third and one half of its total expansion
from operating surpluses (Kocka 1978: 565–566; Grant et al. 1988: 118–119).
Moreover, as Herrigel (1996) has demonstrated, some German regions (e.g.
Siegen, Baden-Württemberg) followed a decentralized industrialization pattern in
which small- and medium-sized firms were dominant. Richard Deeg’s work sug-
gests (Deeg 2000) that until the 1920s, the financial needs of these regions were
typically served by smaller savings and co-operative banks rather than the big
universal banks.
While there is admittedly an empirical variety of German Hausbank relationships,
the importance of close relations between ‘big banks’ and ‘big business’ in Ger-
man industrial history cannot be overlooked. The three major universal banks
(Disconto-Gesellschaft, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank) were established by in-
dustrialists in order to raise capital by issuing and trading stock. By the same to-
ken, the banks bought shareholdings in multinational companies and later sought
to monopolize the financial arrangements of ‘their’ industrial customers and to
serve them in various ways ‘from the cradle to the grave’. Industrial partners
were committed to conduct all financial business only with them, including
lending and giro transactions (Dyson 1986: 120–123; Gall 1995: 1–113). Banks also
                                                
4 More in Ronge (1979).
5 See for an overview of the more critical literature, Deeg (2000).
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sought direct influence on all the important investment decisions of the compa-
nies which they helped to finance while, on the other hand, they were prepared
to accept short-term financial losses in order to secure their long-term co-opera-
tion (Kocka 1978: 565–568).
Particularly during periods of crisis, the major private commercial banks used
their close connections to industry to attain (additional) seats on the supervisory
boards of their corporate clients, to increase their own shareholdings and, lastly,
to procure more voting rights at the shareholders’ meetings of these corporations.
In addition, they held proxy voting power, which gave banks the right to vote on
behalf of customers who had shares deposited with them. The cartels set up by
these big banks in the steel and electronics industries in order to save Krupp
(1966) and AEG-Telefunken (1979) have a nearly legendary status. In both cases,
the respective Hausbank first organized a supportive banking consortium and ad-
ditional loan guarantees from the federal and Länder governments. Then bank
representatives assumed seats on the supervisory boards of these companies in
order to better supervise the rescue operation.6
At the same time that German universal banks were emerging and becoming
closely integrated with industry, the foundations of German corporate law were
being laid. The salient features of this body of law were, firstly, the extensive
autonomy granted corporate boards with regard to the disclosure of company in-
formation and, secondly, the control of company policy given to insider net-
works. In 1870, on the eve of the foreseeable period of rapid industrial expansion
(Gründerjahre), the mandatory licensing of corporations was done away with and
the German Commercial Code of 1861 became the framework for company foun-
ders. In keeping with the common business practices of the time, entrepreneurs
were simply obliged to show ‘adequate and orderly bookkeeping’ as proof that
they were upholding the principle of ‘commercial prudence’. Statutory disclosure
regulations governing the issuing of equities did not exist. In the wake of the cri-
sis that followed this boom and of innumerable bankruptcies of stock companies,
the state turned over its role as the formal supervisory agent to supervisory
boards in 1884, which were responsible for the appointment and supervision of a
company’s board of directors and for approving certain business decisions. Such
supervisory boards represented the most important groups of shareholders, most
of which were banks, the family owners or employees of the company (Tilly
1999: 139). In the 1950s, labour became part of the stakeholder network that su-
                                                
6 As a result of this strategy, big banks controlled a high percentage of industrial
holdings and voting rights: In 1980, the Dresdner Bank held more than 25 percent of
the shares of 15 companies. According to the report issued in 1976 by the commission
on monopolies, banks held nearly 15 percent of all board seats in the 100 largest
companies and the chairmanship in 31 cases (Dyson 1986: 130).
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pervised the work of the company’s management. In coal, iron, and steel compa-
nies with more than 1,000 employees, supervisory boards were organized on a
model of parity codetermination with representatives from the unions and share-
holders’ groups; in 1976, this principle was extended in the Codetermination Law
to include all companies with more than 2,000 employees.
In a structural model that is based on a pronounced degree of self-regulation by
banks, industry, and labour, the state does not play a major role. The autonomy
of the German Federal Bank has been seen as one of the foremost factors in hin-
dering the state from dictating monetary policy (Hall 1986). But the state is in-
volved in making managed capitalism work, sometimes indirectly and sometimes
decisively. For one, the state provides the banking sector with the necessary
autonomy to regulate itself by granting banking associations the status of public
institutions, implicitly committing them to act in the public interest. For another,
the state codifies into law collectively negotiated settlements, such as the capital
adequacy standards set by the banking associations, and makes these compulsory
for all sectors of the market. As a partner in corporatist alliances, the state invests
resources and thereby compensates its partners for concessions made, which in
turn helps produce agreements.
Overall, the advantage of managed capitalism is that it combines stability with
social balance: Risks are internalized through collective self-help, corporate deci-
sions are controlled by an insider network, losers in the structural processes of
modernization are compensated. However, a considerable disadvantage of the
model is that the game plan of co-operation is devised by the insiders and re-
mains obscure for outsiders, including small shareholders.
A New Framework: Globalization, Europeanization and the Impact
on Germany
In the 1970s, after the Bretton Woods system fell apart and a transition to flexible
exchange rates was made, an international trend to disassemble national controls
over capital movement began to emerge. Governments permitted the trade of fi-
nancial products and lowered the barriers for membership of foreigners on the
domestic stock exchanges. The push to turn much of Europe into one large do-
mestic market forced the integration of national financial markets beginning in
the mid-1980s. Thanks to such a ‘European passport’, banks, stock exchanges,
stockbrokers and security brokerages were able to offer their services throughout
Europe as long as they upheld the minimum standards of capital adequacy and
investor protection. The project to unify Europe monetarily reduces the profit
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margin in foreign exchange trading and pressures national financial markets to
become more competitive. A European antitrust policy, endowed with special
powers by the European Commission, is being pushed ahead to tackle barriers
blocking further market integration.
Since the 1980s, a fundamental structural change has become evident: the busi-
ness of issuing and trading securities has become much more attractive than
lending money. For large creditworthy firms in particular, it is often cheaper to
acquire capital on international markets by issuing shares or bonds than to seek
loans from their Hausbank (‘securitization’; OECD 1995). Banks are being side-
stepped by their former customers as the classic financial intermediary (‘disin-
termediation’), leaving the banks to get more involved in the lucrative business of
securities trading. Institutional investors have experienced a growth spurt in the
last 15 years, especially in the United States and Great Britain, that has made
them major contenders in security markets internationally. Because they act as
shareholders in large companies and as security buyers, these insurance compa-
nies, pension funds, and investment funds have been courted by banks and big
business. Since institutional investors tend to diversify their portfolios interna-
tionally and operate with large blocks of the most liquid shares, they are in an ex-
cellent position to pursue their own interests by playing national financial cen-
tres, financial brokers, and capital-seeking companies off against one another.
While the market is being expanded, efforts are also being made politically to
adapt the legal framework of the financial business and corporate governance to
international standards. The European Commission envisions an integrated Euro-
pean capital market that also promotes investor protection by creating transpar-
ency in capital market transactions and in the business affairs of companies listed
on the stock exchange. All the same, the initial steps in starting the dynamic pace
of Europeanization were the individual national strides toward harmonization: In
1986 many countries, such as Great Britain, France, Spain, and Italy, began codi-
fying and formalizing regulations pertaining to investor protection while estab-
lishing and expanding governmental supervision of the organized capital market.
The motor driving this process has been fuelled by the United States, where the
regulatory authority for the national capital market (Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, SEC) has dedicated itself to the ‘mission’ of protecting investors. Compa-
nies wanting to be listed on an American stock exchange must guarantee that
their accounting is ‘transparent’, in an American sense of the term, so that imme-
diate transactions involving the capital market can be better monitored. On the
international level, the SEC has successfully blocked any attempt by international
‘regimes’ to introduce standards of capital market regulation7 that appear to
                                                
7 These include the IOSCO (International Organization of Securities Commissions) and
the IASC (International Accounting Standards Setting Committee). Whereas the
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threaten American interests. On the European level, the process of adapting to the
American standards was completed for all practical purposes with the EU direc-
tives on ‘insider trading’ (89/582/EEC, 13 November 1989) and on ‘investment
services’ (93/227/EEC, 10 May 1993). For the first time, insider-trading was le-
gally prohibited and a network of domestic oversight bodies was established to
insure international co-operation in regulating capital markets.
In the mid-1980s, banks, big business, and even German governmental authori-
ties found themselves forced to take into consideration the needs of (foreign) in-
stitutional investors, their new target group, when shaping their own company
policy or when restructuring the domestic financial marketplace. Important ele-
ments of the older German model threatened to impede considerably the com-
petitiveness of the German economy. One such element in corporate law was the
importance given the rules – self-made and self-monitored by an insider network
– that regulated the conduct of the providers of financial services in capital mar-
kets or the conduct of company management toward investors. Foreign institu-
tional investors and the SEC criticized the existing system of informal self-
regulation for its lack of transparency and accountability. In addition, the SEC
prohibited the sale of new stock exchange products in America by arguing that
these came from a market operating with standards lower than its own (Lütz
1998). American authorities and investors hold a similar position with regard to
the German, i.e. the Continental model of accounting standards, which gives
management more leeway to calculate and report profits and losses over longer
periods. So far, the SEC has recognized neither the German Commercial Code
(Handelsgesetzbuch, HGB) nor the internationally co-ordinated International Ac-
counting Standards (IAS) as a ticket to the American capital market. Instead, for-
eign firms wishing to be listed on the American stock exchange are required to
follow American standards (General Accepted Accounting Principles, GAAP).8
There was a time in Germany when close relationships within industry, but also
between banks and industry were considered to be the key to successfully man-
aging a business crisis or preventing ‘hostile takeovers’. Now, foreign investors
view ‘Germany, Inc.’ as a handicap to investment. Cases such as the bankruptcy
of Schneider Enterprises and the crises of the Metallgesellschaft or recently the
Holzmann company made the banks look like clueless creditors and the supervi-
                                                                                                                                           
IOSCO is dedicated to negotiating norms in the broadest sense for securities, repre-
sentatives within the IASC attempt to agree on an international accounting standard.
8 On the political struggles between Europe and the United States with regard to
global accounting standards, see Financial Times, 25 March 1999, p. 6, Handelsblatt, 9/
10 April 1999, p. 18, Financial Times, 19 November 1999, p. 5 and on the perceived
‘disadvantages’ of the German HGB compared with US GAAP, see Financial Times
Deutschland, 21 February, 2000, p. XIV.
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sory boards like incompetent ‘closed shops’. International alliances of institu-
tional investors have formulated principles for ‘good corporate governance’ that
call for a greater distance of supervisory boards to their corporations and a limi-
tation on the number of seats in Germany. 9 For the big banks, which are engaged
increasingly in investment banking and act as security traders and business con-
sultants, it could become disadvantageous to own large amounts of industrial
stock and to hold seats on a number of supervisory boards. Many companies do
not even want to be advised by a bank that owns stock in their competitor or
holds a seat on its supervisory board.10
Pressure has been mounting since the mid-1980s not only on private market in-
vestors but also on the state to make the domestic market an internationally com-
petitive ‘financial centre’. The complaint made by foreign investors that German
corporate law lacked investor protection measures was addressed to the Federal
Ministries for Justice (BMJ) and Finance (BMF), which are responsible for all is-
sues regarding capital markets, including corporate and stock exchange law. On
the European level, both ministries had long attempted to defend traditional
Continental accounting practices or, more specifically, the informal self-regula-
tion of capital markets. With regard to accounting standards, it was clear by 1990
at the latest that the strategy had failed when the European Commission ceased
to issue further directives and turned the project of harmonization over to the In-
ternational Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). This body consists not only
of representatives from selected European states and Japan, India, Malaysia,
Mexico and South Africa, but also of delegates primarily from countries with a
tradition in Anglo-American accounting (such as the United States, Great Britain,
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand), who often cast the decisive votes in im-
portant decisions. 11 Still, the German finance ministry attempted to prevent pa s-
sage of the insider-trading directive in the Council of Ministers. The Germans
found themselves isolated on this issue and faced with the possibility of being
overridden by a qualified majority of member states. Moreover, they discovered
that Germany’s reluctance to establish a governmental authority to monitor the
national capital market was steadily turning into a obstacle for international co-
operation (Lütz 1998).
                                                
9 Financial Times, 6 April, 1998, p. 6.
10 Financial Times, 3 September, 1997, p. 15.
11 On IASC, see http: //www.iasc.org.uk.
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On the Road to a New Model? Commercialization, Pluralization and
Regulation
The relationship between the three German banking groups, which had maintained a
commercial form of peaceful coexistence until now, is becoming more and more
tense. The trade associations of both the private and public banking sectors no
longer hesitate to battle out their differences in the press. 12 Structural changes in
the international financial markets and the plurality of interests arising from these
changes, especially among private and public banks, have turned this latent con-
flict into open hostility. As the profit margins dwindle in the classic lending and
savings deposit business, savings banks and credit co-operatives are beginning to
consolidate their operations, a move that places the markedly decentralized na-
ture of both banking groups in question. So far, not one credit co-operative bank
has been closed; instead, problematic situations have been corrected in the time-
tested manner of fusing banks under the supervision of the umbrella association.
In the savings bank sector, pressures to modernize the decentralized sectoral
structure spurred efforts to centralize product development and the settlement of
equity trading activities or to establish a centralized online brokerage service.
Also, regional governments like Baden-Württemberg and Saxony have put politi-
cal pressure on their local governments, regional savings bank associations and
regional public sector banks (Landesbanken) to join forces. The state of Saxony, in
particular, has pushed ahead the idea of a ‘Saxony Holding’, including the state’s
Landesbank, the ‘Sächsische Aufbaubank’ (another large state-owned bank), and 22
smaller savings banks. Critics, such as regional savings associations and trade
unions, argue that the plan challenges the principle of territoriality and that it will
lead to massive job losses among regional savings banks. 13
This strong resistance indicates that in this sector, concentration processes are
considerably buffered by different veto players expecting to lose their autonomy
in the face of further consolidation. This argument is also true for regional gov-
ernments themselves. On the one hand, states are pushing the centralization of
the public banking structure on their own territories; on the other hand, they are
still rejecting the idea of merging all 13 regional public sector banks or of incorpo-
rating them in a holding structure.14
                                                
12 See for instance, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 5 August 1999, p. 25, 6 August
1999, p. 25.
13 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1 December 1999, pp. W 1–2.
14 Financial Times Deutschland, 14 March 2000, p. 1.
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The future structure and business strategy of the saving banks association, how-
ever, rests upon the decision whether or not to retain the state-guaranteed status
enjoyed by such banks, which has become unique in Europe. Should the savings
bank sector be privatized, the consequence would be an acceleration of the con-
centration process by merging savings banks and credit co-operatives or by
merging larger savings banks and private banks. So far, the federal government
and the majority of the German Länder have opted to retain the public banking
system. Opponents of this system, however, are resorting more and more to
European anti-subsidy laws in order to question its legitimacy. In 1994, the Ger-
man association of private banks, in co-operation with its counterparts in Great
Britain and France, filed a formal objection with the European Commission that
accused the government of North Rhine-Westphalia of illegally subsidizing the
Westdeutsche Landesbank (WestLB, West German State Bank). In 1992, the gov-
ernment had offered the bank a capital infusion in the form of publicly owned
housing assets at the rock-bottom interest rate of 0.6 percent. The private banks
argue that their public competitors enjoy better ratings, and thus significant ad-
vantages in refinancing thanks to state guarantees. In July 1999, the EU Commis-
sion ruled that the WestLB had to repay the government of North Rhine-West-
phalia subsidies amounting to nearly DM 1.6 billion. This ruling was a signal to
other German Länder governments, in which similar practices were common. In
September 1999, the Commission asked the German government for information
about six other Landesbanken that were involved in transactions comparable to the
WestLB.15 Similarly, the European Commission is examining whether the special
feature of German banking in which communal and regional governments back
up their public sector banks with unlimited liability guarantees must be consid-
ered an unacceptable state subsidy. 16 Moreover, the European Banking Federa-
tion, the association of private banks in Europe, has prepared a formal complaint
to the Commission about the controversial state guarantees for the Landesbanken,
which it says discriminate against the private banks. 17
So far, the WestLB has not paid back the subsidy. The state government of North
Rhine-Westphalia does not want the money back and has instead proposed in-
creasing its 43 percent equity stake in the bank rather than receiving the payment
in cash. Concluding that this would do nothing to eliminate the cost advantages
the WestLB had gained when it received the aid, the Commission rejected the
proposal. In March 2000 the conflict escalated even further when German re-
gional leaders from Bavaria, Hesse, Bremen and Thuringia threatened to block
the EU’s enlargement process in the Bundesrat, the German upper house, if Brus-
                                                
15 Financial Times, 25 November 1999, p. 2.
16 Handelsblatt, 7/8 May 1999 p. 2.
17 Financial Times, 2 December 1999, p. 16.
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sels did not leave the Landesbanken alone.18 The Commission has threatened to
take Germany to the European court if it presents no new proposals as to how the
subsidies should be paid back. The federal government however, is seeking a
compromise with Brussels on the state subsidies issue, because it does not want
to impede the process of European integration.19
These examples show how sensitive the private banking sector is to practices that
allegedly place it at a disadvantage when competing on European and even
world markets. Big private commercial banks are concentrating their business in
the commission-earning business of securities trading. In the last couple of years,
they pursued an aggressive merger strategy abroad in order to acquire the know-
how of British and American investment banks. The Deutsche Bank merged first
with Morgan Grenfell and in 1998 with Bankers Trust, while the Dresdner Bank
joined with Kleinwort Benson. The failed merger of the former rivals Deutsche
and Dresdner Bank, however, does indicate a qualitative shift with regard to the
upcoming structural changes on international banking markets. The merger
would have suggested an end to the old European universal bank model. The
new group would have largely abandoned retail banking and instead focused on
more profitable areas such as private banking for wealthy clients, asset manage-
ment and especially corporate and investment banking. 20
Domestically, the big banks are deliberately disengaging themselves from industry
(Esser 1990; Edwards/Fischer 1994; Schröder 1996; Deeg 1999) in an effort to im-
prove their international reputation as security traders and business consultants.
However, the private banking sector has become increasingly reluctant to enter
risky and therefore expensive rescue operations of all types, which was particu-
larly evident during the process of German unification. To many observers, Ger-
man unification appeared to prove that the co-operative model of crisis manage-
ment works and could survive; the contributions of the state, industry, labour
and banks towards the rebuilding of East Germany were negotiated and then le-
gally stipulated within the framework of the Solidarity Pact (Sally/ Webber 1994).
Under considerable pressure from the federal government, from the Treuhand
Agency, and even from the public, representatives of the banking associations fi-
nally announced in 1993 that they would support the Treuhand Agency with a
billion marks to aid in the process of privatization. By mid-1995, the banks de-
clared that they had already spent their ‘banking billions’. At that point they had
invested DM 340 million in 13 firms, and the savings bank sector had invested a
sum of DM 412 million (Deeg 1999: 195). Banks reacted differently than they once
                                                
18 Institutional reforms that are linked with the EU’s enlargement process would need
German upper house ratification.
19 Financial Times, 3 March 2000, p. 3.
20 Financial Times, 10 March 2000, p. 19, Financial Times, 14 March 2000, p. 15.
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had when a sector of the economy needed to be rescued in a crisis: they used their
investment banking capacities and/or subsidiaries to facilitate the privatization
of Treuhand firms. For example, Deutsche Bank used its subsidiary Morgan
Grenfell and the Roland Berger business consulting firm to advise the Treuhand
Agency in the selling of its companies, to counsel potential buyers of Treuhand
enterprises, and to aid managers of privatized businesses. 21
In the course of unification, the German banks showed little interest in buying
shares in privatized enterprises. This corresponds with an overall strategy of the
big banks to gradually reduce the underperforming shares in their portfolios, al-
though an active management of the stakes has been blocked by the approxi-
mately 50 percent tax payable on capital gains. The Deutsche Bank in particular
has reduced the number of its large industrial holdings (25 percent or more) and
tends to limit many of its holdings to less than ten percent (Deeg 1993: 158). The
Institute for Economic Research (IFO) has estimated that merely 10 percent of the
domestically owned shareholdings in late 1996 were in the hands of the banks
and that shareholdings only comprised two percent of all banking assets (IFO
1997: 10).22
The accumulation of seats held by banks on supervisory boards no longer seems
to be an element of a managed model of capitalism, as it once was. Whereas in
1974 private banks held over 20 percent of the supervisory board seats in the 100
largest companies, by 1993 this percentage had dropped to a mere 6.3 percent
(IFO 1997: 11).23 In addition, Krupp’s attempt at a hostile takeover of its com-
petitor Thyssen in 1997 revealed that structural linkages could be used under new
conditions to break away from earlier principles of consensus. For example, the
groundwork for this takeover attempt was laid by the investment bank subsidi-
aries (Morgan Grenfell and Kleinwort Benson) of the Hausbank that sat on the su-
pervisory boards of both Krupp and Thyssen. Thus, for the first time, German
banks openly sided with the ‘hostile’ attacker, whereas earlier they had defended
German stock companies against an unwanted third party. 24
                                                
21 Deeg (1999: 191–192). Yet, the Treuhand Agency did not turn to the banks in seeking
help for its own refinancing. Instead it issued medium- and long-term bonds and de-
bentures (THA bonds), meaning it turned to international capital markets to raise the
funds it needed (Czada 1996: 167).
22 Data for the period of 1976 to 1986 indicate that the number of firms in which banks
held at least ten percent of shares declined from 129 to 86 (Camman/Arnold 1987:
120–123).
23 Similar data in Jackson (1999: 24).
24 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 March 1997, p. 15.
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Big business is also relaxing its relationship to the banking sector.25 In recent
years, it has expanded its degree of self-finance significantly as opposed to turn-
ing to the banks for loans. In the course of the current wave of transborder acqui-
sitions and mergers, the international capital market is developing into an impor-
tant forum for redefining ownership structures and rules of conduct. The success-
ful takeover of Mannesmann by its British rival Vodafone AirTouch was not only
the world’s largest hostile bid ever ($128 billion), but also exemplifies that Ger-
man companies are possible targets for hostile takeovers because their stock
prices are estimated to be undervalued in light of the undisclosed reserves that
they have accumulated. The bid battle was run according to ‘Anglo-Saxon market
logic’ since Mannesmann’s eventual acceptance of the deal was largely due to
pressure from shareholders, i.e. institutional investors.
Deals such as the merger of DaimlerChrysler and the consolidations of Degussa
and Hüls and of Hoechst and Rhône-Poulenc are staged by investment banks,
which then establish contacts to investors. Currently, foreign investors own be-
tween 40 and 70 percent of the shares in 10 of the largest 100 German companies
(60–70 percent of shares in the former Mannesmann AG and in the Metallgesell-
schaft compared, for example, with 44 percent of Veba).26
These globally oriented companies claim to be the vanguard of a corporate policy
that includes shareholder value-principles such as higher dividend payments and
balance sheet disclosure. Companies like Hoechst, Schering, BASF or SAP plan in
the future to increase the use of Anglo-Saxon instruments such as share-buy-back
programs. Another important element of this new corporate policy is to nurture
relations to investors. The Deutscher Investor Relations Kreis, e.V. (DIRK) is an or-
ganization founded in 1990 that now comprises of 110 companies quoted on the
exchange and is dedicated to sharing experiences in dealing with investors both
at home and abroad.
As corporate financing becomes internationalized, more German firms are being
listed on foreign, usually American, stock exchanges. For a long time, German
companies were deterred from entering the American capital market because the
SEC would not recognize German or even the internationally established stan-
dards of accounting (IAS). In 1993, Daimler-Benz became the first company to
abandon the domestic camp and to switch its accounting practices to the Ameri-
can GAAP standards in order to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange – a
step that came under heavy fire in Germany and weakened the German position
in the organizations upholding the international standards of accounting. To date,
                                                
25 For more on the current debate on German corporate governance, see Faust (1999).
26 See the database of the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies on the interna-
tionalization of the 100 largest German companies (Hassel et al. 2000: 19).
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Deutsche Telekom, Hoechst, SAP, VEBA and SGL Carbon AG have followed the
example of Daimler-Benz.27
The fact that a certain sector of the business world, including the banking busi-
ness, is gearing itself to capital markets worldwide indicates that interests are be-
coming more diversified. Whereas the majority of small and mid-sized companies
still prefer to maintain the classic Hausbank relationship with saving banks and
credit co-operatives28 and appear as yet to be unruffled by the discussion con-
cerning the adoption of Anglo-Saxon standards of accounting, the globally ori-
ented segment of the corporate world has become part of a new capital-market-
oriented policy community. This community no longer resembles earlier cartels or
business associations. It includes such representatives of investors’ interests as
the lobbies of companies listed on the exchange that advertise stocks and offer
advanced training in stock market investing, shareholder associations,29 and the
Association of Investment Funds. New professional groups have also developed,
such as the organizations for financial analysts and for certified and chartered ac-
countants, whose expertise in working with new financial products, customers,
and rules is increasingly in demand.
Had the state not paved the way, none of the changes described above would
have been possible. In the older model, the state was more like a partner in a cor-
poratist alliance who approved and codified negotiated solutions. Now it acts as
a benefactor, regulator, and lobbyist of domestic (financial) markets. Since the early
1980s, the state has generated an unprecedented thrust in legislative activity
aimed at promoting Germany as a financial centre. In all, seven laws have been
passed, in part to meet European guidelines but more notably to help remove
gradually the barriers blocking the use of the domestic capital market and the
trade of new financial products. In 1989, the first revision of the German Stock
Exchange Law in nearly a century created the legal framework for establishing
the German Futures Exchange (Deutsche Terminbörse, DTB), in which a number of
foreign financial products such as options, futures, and swaps could be traded.
Between 1990 and 1998, three laws promoting financial markets were passed, of
which the third alone contained 100 different measures. Among the most impor-
tant measures was the admission, in 1994, of money market funds and, in 1998, of
a special retirement savings option that can be organized as a mutual fund. Nev-
                                                
27 In March 2000, 25 German firms were listed on foreign stock exchanges and 11 com-
panies were following US GAAP accounting principles (Hassel et al. 2000: 20).
28 According to recent data of the German Bundesbank, small and medium-sized busi-
nesses have become even more dependent on bank loans (Deutsche Bundesbank
2000: 40).
29 E.g. the Verband der Kleinaktionäre (VdK) and the Deutsche Schutzvereinigung für Wert-
papierbesitz e.V. (DSW).
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ertheless, American-style, tax-favoured pension funds have not yet been intro-
duced because they are stiffly opposed by the German insurance business. In the
field of equity trading, the repurchase of a maximum of ten percent of a com-
pany’s own stock was first approved in the 1998 Control and Transparency Act
(Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich, KonTraG).
The key factor leading to the restructuring of the German model was that the
steps to liberalize the financial market were accompanied by attempts to re-
regulate its framework. Reforms, first in stock exchange regulations and later in
corporate law, sought to make the conduct of market participants and the busi-
ness transactions of companies listed on the exchange more transparent. The Sec-
ond Law for the Promotion of the German Financial Market, passed in 1994,
proved to be the turning point in the history of the German stock exchange be-
cause, following a bitter battle with the Länder, the federal government assumed
responsibility for monitoring the stock exchange for the first time, and a super-
visory agency for security trading (Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel,
BeWe) was established under the jurisdiction of the Federal Ministry of Finance.
Two of the tasks given this agency were to crack down on insider trading, which
had finally been outlawed, and to insure that banks and investment businesses
complied with the new ‘rules of conduct.’30
Additional reforms concentrated on corporate law. With the passage of the
above-mentioned KonTraG in March 1998, the proxy voting rights of the banks
were restricted: If a bank holds more than five percent of a company’s stock, the
bank may no longer automatically assume the proxy voting rights of its invest-
ment customers. Furthermore, banks and businesses must disclose holdings of
over five percent. The effort to reduce the number of supervisory board seats
from 20 to 12 failed to succeed because of opposition from the unions, who feared
losing their rights of codetermination, and from the Ministry of Labour. Against
the initial plans of the Justice Ministry, the VW-law also remained intact, meaning
that no other shareholder was allowed to own more than 20 percent of the voting
rights except the government of Lower Saxony and that the government, as a
shareholder, could not be overridden.
The Justice Ministry was successful, however, in reforming the accounting stan-
dards with the passage of a law facilitating the raising of capital (Kapitalauf-
nahmeerleichterungsgesetz, KapAEG) in April 1998. German companies listed on
the exchange are now allowed to issue consolidated financial statements that are
calculated on the basis of internationally accepted accounting standards (IAS or
US-GAAP). They are exempted from filing the type of annual report required by
                                                
30 For more on centralization processes in systems of financial federalism, see Deeg/
Lütz (2000).
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German law. Thus, lawmakers were merely authorizing the practice of using
American accounting standards that German companies had already actually
adopted upon entering the New York Stock Exchange. In March 1998, a German
Accounting Standards Committee (Deutsches Rechnungslegungs Standards Commit-
tee, DRSC) was established to work out accounting guidelines and to represent
Germany in international organizations.31
In December 1999, the Ministry of Finance unexpectedly announced that it would
abolish the taxes on capital gains from selling equity stakes, held by one quoted
company in another, as of January 2001. In theory, this move would allow com-
panies to divest free of tax the big shareholdings built up in rivals and industrial
groups. However, it seems unlikely that the complex web of holdings between
well-known firms and banks would immediately unravel, since many of the
stakes are so big that a quick sale would be impossible. Nevertheless, the measure
is seen as an important step toward a gradual whittling down of stakes which are
considered non-essential. 32 The ministry’s plan now faces mounting opposition
both from the Christian Democrats and some members of the ruling Social Demo-
cratic Party. The CDU attacked the reform as unfairly benefiting large, publicly
listed groups as it only applies to joint stock and limited companies, while the So-
cial Democratic state governments believe the decision is overly generous to big
business and risks forgoing valuable tax revenues at a time of austerity in state
spending. It seems likely that the Federal Ministry of Finance will give in to the
opposition of the regional governments since the plan is part of a broader tax re-
form which needs ratification of the German upper house.33
Finally, an expert commission chaired by Chancellor Schröder is drawing up
plans to replace Germany’s voluntary takeover code with a new takeover law by
the end of 2000. The expert group was set up to examine the consequences of Vo-
dafone’s successful bid for Mannesmann. The upcoming law is supposed to in-
clude clear rules about the level of shareholdings above which a general offer
must be made for all of the company’s shares and provisions to protect minority
shareholders by ensuring that they be treated equally – in terms of price and in-
formation.34
This burst of activity shows that the state is using its legal and regulatory re-
sources to promote Germany as a financial centre. On the European and global
                                                
31 The committee includes representatives from the Ministry of Justice, private banks
and, in particular, professional organizations such as the one representing the ac-
countants. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30 March 1998, p. 16.
32 Financial Times, 24/25 December 1999, p. 3.
33 Handelsblatt, 8 February 2000, p. 3; Financial Times, 17 March 2000, p. 1.
34 Financial Times, 13 March 2000, p. 2; The Economist, 18 December 1999, p. 136.
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levels, ministries and regulatory agencies act as lobbyists of their country’s own
banks and businesses. The fact that German regulatory traditions are exposed to
considerable pressure to conform to the demands of these new market conditions
is illustrated by the spread of principally American-like standards of transpar-
ency in laws governing capital markets, stock exchanges, and corporate business,
and by the resulting circumvention of international efforts to negotiate standards.
Conclusion: Convergence or the ‘Alternative Path’?
German finance, possibly more so than other economic sectors or political arenas,
is under increasing pressure to structurally change older models of distributing
property rights, conducting politics, and constituting policy. Gone or at least far
less prevalent is the institutional equilibrium between banks, industry, and the
state, which had been maintained by a system of cartels, corporatist self-regula-
tion, and informal norms. Instead, the spectrum of those involved is widening
substantially, interests among industry and banks are becoming more heteroge-
neous and competition between the three major bank groups is increasing. This
trend toward increased commercialization also influences the entire relationship
between banks and industry. In the process of reshaping corporate governance,
the interests of foreign investors and small shareholders are being given more
weight, whereas the power over company policy held by insider networks is con-
sidered less and less legitimate. More than ever, the state is acting both at home
and abroad as benefactor, regulator, and lobbyist for domestic financial centres
and is using its resources to promote competition. The laws passed and regula-
tions enacted to establish the national system reflect the new overriding objective
of every step toward transformation – to make market participants and market
conduct more transparent.
Does this mean that German managed capitalism is unilaterally adapting to an
Anglo-Saxon market-oriented capitalism? Indeed, on the one hand, there is good
reason to assume that German finance will take further steps down the road to a
more market-friendly model. Investment funds will continue to gain ground in
the business of private investment for lack of an attractive alternative. Because of
the financial problems facing the social insurance system, private and company
pension funds will become at the least a supplementary source of old age security
for some time in the German system of social insurance. No one can yet predict
whether this will develop into a ‘grey capitalism’ (Blackburn 1999) based on pen-
sion funds as is known in Great Britain. In any case, as investment funds gain a
stronger foothold in Germany, a lobby of institutional investors increasingly in-
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dependent of the banks will exercise more and more influence on the financial
sector and will demand from politicians more extensive reform in the areas of
corporate law and corporate governance.
Nevertheless, we should not overestimate the extent of the transformation that
has already taken place.35 So far, only the top tier of the globally oriented seg-
ment of the banking and commercial world has been affected. In the more nation-
ally oriented segment of the economy where the clientele consists of small and
medium-sized businesses, banks and industry remain closely meshed, capitalism
continues to be managed through various avenues by organized trade interests,
and corporate governance still exists in forms that permit a great deal of corpo-
rate autonomy. Examples of this are found at the regional level in the continua-
tion of certain types of industrial policy, 36 in the co-ordinated regulation of equity
standards by the major banking associations (Lütz 1999), or in the maintenance of
collective deposit insurance funds. Furthermore, alliances between the federal
government, management, and labour are apparently still possible, as is illus-
trated by the Solidarity Pact that evolved from the process of German unification.
However, the major commercial banks are not included in these networks. 37 Over
time it will become clear how the national model is internally handling the fissure
that has resulted from worldwide developments. The increasing concentration of
businesses through merger and consolidation within the sector of small-business-
oriented savings banks and co-operatives indicates that this clientele is also being
forced by the processes of globalization to accept expensive changes that possibly
even threaten its chances for economic survival.
The transformation that has taken place so far also demonstrates how effectively
institutional structures can halt externally induced processes of adaptation. By far
the most powerful check on the push toward the privatization and concentration
in the public banking sector has been German federalism. The unwillingness of
the regional governments to merge or even privatize their public sector banks
and, for example, the opposition of the government of Lower Saxony to the pro-
                                                
35 Particularly since we did not discuss whether the Anglo-Saxon model is changing,
too.
36 … which are becoming increasingly difficult to maintain in light of the EU ban on
subsidies.
37 The spectacular bailout of the Holzmann company by banks, labour and, most im-
portantly, the state does not reverse this overall trend. The banks would not have
saved the firm from insolvency had the Chancellor himself not subsidized the rescue
operation with state guarantees. Moreover, banks were under pressure from their
own institutional investors to justify this bailout. On the European level, the opera-
tion was criticized for undermining European competition policy and burdening the
stability of the Euro (see Financial Times, 25 November 1999, p. 10, Financial Times, 3
December 1999, p. 1).
Lütz: From Managed to Market Capitalism? 25
posed revocation of its majority voting rights at VW illustrate the zealous effort
the Länder are willing to make in order to retain, if at all possible, their influence
on regional banks and businesses, so as better to implement their industrial pol-
icy. With regard to corporate law reform, the unions, backed by the Labour Min-
istry, have proved to be a formidable lobby, one strong enough to block the
planned reduction of the number of supervisory board seats in companies with
co-determination.38
What does all this show us? The German model of managed capitalism will not
develop into the twin of its market-oriented counterpart. What is far more likely
is that market-oriented elements will be built into the system and therefore a new
‘hybrid’ model will evolve. Whether this new system will finally combine the vir-
tues of the German and the Anglo-Saxon model – social balance and flexibility –
remains to be seen.
                                                
38 See Vitols (1999) for a similar evaluation regarding the winners and losers of this
sectoral restructuring.
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